TsuNAME vulnerability and DDoS against DNS
ISI Technical Report ISI-TR-XXXX
6 May 2021
https://tsuname.io

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ABSTRACT
The Internet’s Domain Name System (DNS) is one of the core services on the Internet. Every web page visit requires a series of DNS queries, and large DNS failures may have cascading consequences, leading to unreachability of major websites and services. In this paper we present TsuNAME, a vulnerability in some DNS resolvers that can be exploited to carry out denial-of-service attacks against authoritative servers. TsuNAME occurs when domain names are misconfigured with cyclic dependent DNS records, and when vulnerable resolvers access these misconfigurations, they begin looping and send DNS queries rapidly to authoritative servers and other resolvers (we observe up to 5.6k queries/s). Using production data from .nz, the country-code top-level domain (ccTLD) of New Zealand, we show how only two misconfigured domains led to a 50% increase on overall traffic volume for the .nz’s authoritative servers. To understand this event, we reproduce TsuNAME using our own configuration, demonstrating that it could be used to overwhelm any DNS Zone. A solution to TsuNAME requires changes to some recursive resolver software, by including loop detection codes and caching cyclic dependent records. To reduce the impact of TsuNAME in the wild, we have developed and released CycleHunter, an open-source tool that allows for authoritative DNS server operators to detect cyclic dependencies and prevent becoming victims of TsuNAME attacks. We use CycleHunter to evaluate roughly 184 million domain names in 7 large, top-level domains (TLDs), finding 44 cyclic dependent NS records (likely from configuration errors) used by 1.4k domain names. However, a well motivated adversary could easily weaponize this vulnerability. We have notified resolver developers and many TLD operators of this vulnerability. Working together with Google, we helped them in mitigate their vulnerability to TsuNAME.

1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet’s Domain Name System (DNS) [17] provides one of the core services of the Internet, by mapping hosts names, applications, and services to IP addresses and other information. Every web page visit requires a series of DNS queries, and large failures of the DNS have severe consequences that make even large websites and other internet infrastructure fail. For example, the Oct. 2016 denial-of-service (DoS) attack against Dyn [4] made many prominent websites such as Twitter, Spotify, and Netflix unreachable to many of their customers [28]. In Oct. 2019, a DDoS against Amazon’s DNS service affected service for a large number of services [43].

The DNS can be seen as a hierarchical and distributed database, where DNS records [18] are stored in and distributed from authoritative servers [10] (for instance, the Root DNS servers [36] distribute records from the Root DNS zone [37]). As such, all information about an end domain name in the DNS are served by authoritative servers for that domain. This information is typically retrieved by recursive resolvers [10], which answer questions originally posed by users and their applications. Recursive resolvers are typically operated by a user’s ISP, or alternatively public DNS resolvers operated by Google [8], Cloudflare [1], Quad9 [30], Cisco OpenDNS [26] and others.

The configuration of authoritative servers and their records is prone to several types of errors [2, 27, 40]. We examine the specific case of cyclic dependency [27], an error which occurs when NS records for two delegations point to each other. Since NS records define authoritative servers used to resolve a domain [17], when a cyclic dependency occurs, neither name can be definitively resolved. For example, in Figure 1, the NS record of example.org is cat.example.com, and the NS record of example.com is mouse.example.org. This misconfiguration (example.org→example.com) creates a situation in which resolvers cannot retrieve the IP addresses associated with NS records for either zone. Without these addresses,
recursive resolvers are unable to answer any questions from their clients about that portion of the DNS tree below these delegation points\(^1\).

The first contribution of this paper is to report that, in the wild, cyclic dependencies can result in a query cascade that greatly increases traffic to authoritative servers. An example of this problem is the .nz event (§2). On 2020-02-01, a configuration error (i.e., not an intentional attack) resulted in two domains being misconfigured with cyclic dependent NS records. That, in turn, was followed by a 50% traffic volume surge to the authoritative servers for the country-code top-level domain (ccTLD) of New Zealand (.nz), from 800M to 1.2B daily queries – and the extra queries were all related to the two misconfigured domains, which saw themselves a 7643x traffic growth (shaded area in Figure 2).

Even though this event did not disrupt the .nz authoritative servers, it caused a 50% traffic growth in the total traffic. However, the same misconfiguration can also lead to even far more queries, depending on the domain and TLD: after we disclosed this vulnerability to TLD operators, an European ccTLD shared with us that it had experienced 10x traffic growth after two domains where misconfigured with cyclic dependencies.

These examples bring us to question: what would happen if an attacker would intentionally misconfigure hundreds of domains this way, at the same time? The .nz event demonstrates what only two domains can do, but a motivated attacker could cause a far larger traffic surge, which could ultimately overwhelm authoritative servers, affecting all their users, and possibly affecting additional zones due to collateral damage. This poses a great concern for any domains and registrations points, such as TLDs and ccTLDs. Critical domains, and ccTLDs in particular, frequently provide essential services to their users, such as access to government services, banking and online shopping.

Our second contribution is to demonstrate this threat in controlled conditions in §3. We emulate a TsuNAME event by setting up multiple cyclic dependent domain names under our control on our servers (so as to not harm others) and measure the consequences. We show that Google’s public DNS (GDNS) is responsible for the bulk of queries, but we also found other vulnerable resolvers in 260 Autonomous Systems (ASes). Following responsible disclosure practices, we notified Google and other TLD and resolver operators. Google and OpenDNS, have already fixed their software.

Our final contribution is to develop CycleHunter, a tool that finds cyclic dependencies in DNS zone files (§4). This tool allows authoritative server operators (such as ccTLD operators) to identify and mitigate cyclic dependencies, preemptively protecting their authoritative servers from possible TsuNAME attacks. We use CycleHunter to evaluate the Root DNS zone and 7 other TLDs (~185M domain names altogether), and found cyclic dependent domains in half of these zones.

We made CycleHunter publicly available at Github and we thank the various contributors that have helped improve the tool. We have carefully disclosed our findings with the relevant DNS communities.

2 \textbf{.nz EVENT}

On 2020-02-01, two domains (DomainA and DomainB) under .nz had their NS records misconfigured to be cyclically dependent. DomainA NS records were pointed to ns[1,2].DomainB.nz, while DomainB NS records pointed to ns[1,2].DomainA.nz. This configuration error led to a 50% surge in query volume at .nz authoritative servers (Figure 2). The .nz operators manually fixed this misconfiguration on 2020-02-17, after which the queries returned to normal levels.

2.1 Query sources

During the sixteen day period of the TsuNAME event (2020-02-01–17), there were 4.07B combined queries for DomainA and DomainB, with a daily average of 269M. Figure 3a shows the top 10 ASes for query volume during the event period. The overwhelming majority (99.99\%) of the traffic originated from Google (AS15169), with only 324k queries from 579 other ASes – the queries from Google outnumbered the other ASes by 4 orders of magnitude.

For comparison, Figure 3b shows the top 10 ASes for both domains during the “normal” periods when there was no cyclic dependency, spanning over the 16 days before and after the TsuNAME period (2020-01-24–30 and 2020-02-18–28). During this “normal” period, Google sent no more than 100k daily queries for both DomainA and DomainB. During the

\(^1\)Although parent authoritative servers provide IP addresses for NS records within a child domain (known as glue records), they cannot provide them for NS records that exist in other zones.
TsuNAME period, however, Google’s query volume multiplied 5453x (Figure 3c). No other AS had an traffic growth larger than 100x in the same period. (Google operates Google Public DNS – GDNS – a large, popular public resolver service [8] and makes up 8% of all queries sent to .nz [20]).

2.2 Scrutinizing Google queries

The question Why was Google solely responsible for most of the queries? relates to two others: How long should resolvers retry when resolving domains with cyclic dependencies? And how aggressive should be they be when finding answers?

Previous research has shown resolvers will hammer unresponsive authoritative servers [23] – with up to 8 times more queries, depending on the DNS records’ time-to-live (TTL) value. But in the case of cyclic dependencies, authoritative servers are responsive and resolvers bounce from one authoritative server to another, asking the same sequence of questions repeatedly. As such, cyclic dependency is different from the (partial) unresponsiveness situation discussed in [23].

Given that Google was responsible for virtually all queries during the .nz TsuNAME event for DomainA and DomainB (§2.1), we isolate and study the queries from Google. Table 1 shows the breakdown of the query names and types from Google during the .nz event. (NS records store the authoritative server names of a domain, while A [17] and AAAA records [42] store each server’s IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, respectively). We see that most queries to .nz are for A and AAAA records for the two domain’s own NS records. These queries, however, can never be resolved in this cyclic dependent scenario, as one authoritative server keeps forwarding resolvers to the other. The NS records, however, were readily available within the .nz zone – which explains the lower volume of queries.

2.2.1 Interquery interval. How frequently did GDNS resolvers send .nz queries for these domains during the TsuNAME event? To measure this, we pick a date (2020-02-06) during the period and compute the inter-query interval time, i.e., the time in-between two queries arriving from the same IP address to the .nz authoritative servers for the same query name and type.

Figure 4 shows the results (for space constraints, we show only results for the queries highlighted in the green rows of Table 1). We start with the NS queries to DomainA.nz. Figure 4a shows individual resolvers on the x axis, and number of queries on they sent on the right y axis. We see that all resolvers send fewer than 10k queries. On the left y axis, we show the interval inter-quartile range (IQR) of the time between queries (with the green line showing the median value in ms). Given that the TTL value of these records is 86400 s (1 day), we should not see any resolver sending more than one query on this date (anycast-based resolvers cache has multiple layer of complexity, and are not always shared [23, 31]).

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As shown in Table 1, the bulk of queries is for A and AAAA records of the authoritative servers of DomainA and DomainB. Figure 4b shows the results for A records of ns1.DomainA.nz. We see three categories of resolvers, according to their query volume, which we highlight in different colors. The first
3.1 New domain experiment

In this first experiment, we are interested in determining the lower bound in queries that authoritative servers can experience during a TsuNAME event, by using domain names never used beforehand, so they would not have been cached or have a query history.

**Setup:** we configure two third-level domains with cyclic dependencies (Table 2). We use third-level instead of second-level domains given it is the authoritative servers of the parent zone that experience the traffic surge – if example.org is misconfigured, it is its parent .org authoritative servers that will see the traffic surge.

We ran our own authoritative servers using BIND9 [14], one of the most popular open-source authoritative server software, on Linux virtual machines in located at AWS EC2 (Frankfurt).

To minimize caching effects, we set every DNS record with a TTL = 1s (Table 2). By doing that, we maximize the chances of cache miss, increasing total traffic we observe at our authoritative servers.

**Vantage points (VPs):** we use ~10k Ripe Atlas probes [33, 34] as VPs. Ripe Atlas probes comprise a network of more than 11k active devices, distributed among 6740 ASes across the globe (Jan. 2021). They can be used to carry out ICMP, DNS, HTTP, and other types of measurements. They are also publicly accessible as well as the datasets of our experiments [32].
We configure each Atlas Probes to send only one A record query for $PID. sub. verfwinkel.net.$, where PID is the probe unique ID [35]. By doing that, we reduced the risk of warming up the resolver’s caches for other VPs. The query is sent to each probe’s local resolver, as can be seen in Figure 5. As one probe may have multiple resolvers, we consider a VP as a unique probe ID and each of its resolvers.

3.1.1 Results: Table 3 shows the results for this measurement ("new domain" column). On the client side, i.e., traffic measured between Atlas probes and their 1st level recursive resolvers (Figure 5), we see ~9.7k Atlas probes that form 16.8k vantage points. Altogether, they send 18715 queries to their first level resolvers (retrieved from Ripe Atlas, publicly available at [32]), which are mostly answered as SERVFAIL [17] or they simply timeout – both status indicating issues in the domain name resolution.

Heavy traffic growth on the authoritative server side: on the authoritative server side (between authoritative servers and $n_{1h}$ level resolvers in Figure 5), we see ~11k IPs addresses. As each Atlas probe query its resolver, their resolver, in turn, may forward the queries to other resolvers, and so forth [23, 31], – and our authoritative servers see only the last resolver in the chain. In total, these resolvers belong to ~2.6k ASes, and ended up sending ~ 8M queries to both authoritative servers – an traffic growth of 435x with regards to client side queries.

Identifying problematic resolvers. Figure 6 shows the time-series of both queries and resolvers we observe at our authoritative servers (each line shows a different authoritative server, one per domain). We identify three phases in this measurement: the first phase (green shaded area, $x < 14:30$ UTC, is the warmup phase: this is when the VPs send the queries we have configured. We see more than 150k (Figure 6a) arriving each authoritative server, from roughly 5k resolvers (Figure 6b).

After 14:30, however, Atlas probes stop sending queries to their 1st level resolvers. Even in the absence of Atlas probes, the authoritative servers keep on receiving queries from resolvers – as shown in the salmon area (”Resolvers in Loop”). We label these resolvers as problematic: they should not have been resending queries for hours and hours. In total, we see 574 resolvers from 37 Ases showing this looping behavior (New domain in Table 4).

The last phase ($x > 19:30$) is when we stopped BIND9 on our authoritative servers, and kept on collecting incoming queries (”offline” phase). At that stage, our servers became unresponsive. Once the problematic resolvers cannot obtain any answers, they quickly give up and the number of queries reduce significantly. Without our manual intervention, one
may wonder when these loops would stop. As we shown in §4.2, such loops may last for weeks.

It’s not only a Google issue: Figure 7 shows the histogram of queries per source ASes, sorted by total queries. We see than the #1 AS (Google, 15169) is responsible for most queries (~ 60%), a far more modest figure than on the .nz event (§2). We see that other ASes are also affected by the same problem: AS200050 (ITSvision) and AS30844 (Liquid Telecom) send both a significant amount of queries as well. In fact, we found in this experiment that 37 ASes were vulnerable to TsuNAME (Table 4).

Table 4: Problematic Resolvers found on Emulation experiments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Queries</th>
<th>Resolvers</th>
<th>ASes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New domain</td>
<td>7.5M</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recurrent</td>
<td>30.6M</td>
<td>1423</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinkhole</td>
<td>18.1M</td>
<td>2652</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unique</td>
<td>56.2M</td>
<td>3696</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: New domain: queries per AS with problematic resolvers

How often do the problematic resolvers loop? For each problematic resolver, we compute the interval between queries for the query name and query type, for each authoritative server, as in §2.2. Figure 8 shows the top 50 resolvers that sent queries to one of the authoritative servers for A records of ns.sub.cachetest.net. We see a large variation in behavior. The first resolver ($x = 1$) sends a query every 13ms, and accumulated 858k queries during the “Resolvers in loop”. The other resolvers ($20 < x < 50$) all belong to Google, and have a more stable behavior; sending roughly the same number of queries over the same interval (median 2900 ms). As shown in Figure 7, taking altogether, Google resolvers are responsible for most of the queries, but they are not the most aggressive individually. Resolvers 7–19 loop every second, while resolvers 20–50 query on median every 3s – and the latter all are from Google.

Figure 8: New domain: IQR and queries for A records of ns.sub.cachetest.net

4 DETECTING CYCLIC DEPENDENCIES
TsuNAME attacks are intrinsically asymmetrical: the victims (authoritative server operators) are typically different companies from the attackers (vulnerable resolvers operators). Next we assume the side of authoritative server operator, and work on preventing TsuNAME attacks, by detecting and removing cyclic dependencies from their zones.

We present CycleHunter, a tool that we developed that proactively detects cyclic dependencies in zone files, and allow operators to discovery them before problematic resolvers do. We make CycleHunter publicly available at http://tsuname.io and [6]. CycleHunter is particular useful for TLDs that have open registration, which gives the registrants full control over the NS records they choose, and and attacker can exploit this.

CycleHunter uses active DNS measurements to detect cyclic dependencies, given many NS records in a DNS zone are typically out-of-zone (out-of-bailiwick) [40]. As such, it requires knowledge from external zones, which could only be done if an operator had in possession all necessary zone files. We assume that the CycleHunter user maintains one or few zones, and does not have full knowledge of all external zones, as most ccTLD operators, and, as such, needs to execute active measurements.

4.1 CycleHunter
Figure 9 shows CycleHunter’s workflow. It is divided in four main parts, which we describe next:

1. Zone Parser: we start with this module, that reads a DNS zone file, such as the .org zone. Zone files contains delegations, and various types of records (A, AAA, NS, SOA, DNSSEC, and so forth). This modul extracts only the NS records, outputting into a text file (NS List in Figure 9). Our goal is to determine which of these NS records are cyclic dependent, and, ultimately, what domains names in the zone file use those cyclic dependent NS records. Given many domain names are configured to use the same authoritative servers [3, 15], this step significantly reduces the search.
space. For example, the .com has 151M domain names, but only 2.19M unique NS records (Table 5).

2. Resolve NS list: this module tries to resolve every single NS record in the NS list. CycleHunter uses whatever resolver the computer is configured with (we use BIND 9 in our experiments), and queries for the start-of-authority (SOA) record [17], a record that every domain must have, for each NS in NS list. If a resolver is capable to retrieve a domain’s SOA record, it means that the domain is resolvable and, as such, not cyclic dependent. Thus, we are interested only in domains that fail this test, given cyclic dependent NS records are not resolvable either.

3. Find Cycle: this module is the one that ultimately detects cyclic dependent NS records. A NS record resolution from step 2 can fail for several reasons: the domain name does not exist (NXDOMAIN), lame delegations (the servers are not authoritative for the domain [16]), transient failures, and so forth.

This module tells cyclic depend zones from other types of errors. It starts by creating Authority objects (to store Authority Section DNS data [17]) for each NS in NS list. For example, suppose that ns0.wikimedia.org was in the NS list (Figure 10). This module then creates an Authority object for this NS record, which includes its parent zone wikimedia.org and its NS records (wikimedia.org: [ns1,ns2].example.com). It does that by querying the parent authoritative servers instead of the unresponsive cyclic NS records – in our example, it retrieves the authority data for wikimedia.org directly from the .org authoritative servers.

The next step consists in determining what zones this Authority zone depends, by analyzing its own NS records. In our fictional example, we see that wikimedia.org depends on example.com. So we also need to create an authority object for example.com, and determine what zones it depends on. The final step consist in comparing these two authority objects: as can be see in Figure 10, example.com NS records depend on wikimedia.org, which in turn depends on example.com, creating a cyclic dependency between wikimedia.org and example.com.

CycleHunter is also able to detect other types of dependencies. For example, if the zone wikimedia.org would have a in-zone NS record (ns3.wikimedia.org) but with an unresponsive or lame glue (or missing glue), CycleHunter would then classify this zone as cyclic dependent with in-zone NS record (“FullDepWithInZone”).

Zone Matcher: the last module of CycleHunter tells which domains in the DNS zone use those cyclic dependent NS records found by Find Cycle. For example, ns0.wikimedia.org could have been the authoritative server for both dog.org and cat.org.

Performance: CycleHunter is a concurrent and asynchronous application that allows the user to set as a parameter the number of threads/workers. As such, the performance largely depends on the hosting system. On a 4-core AWS EC2 instance, we managed to resolve ~ 280 NS records per second, with 400 workers and running BIND9 on the same machine. This is enough to crawl a zone such as the .nl zone NS records within 5min, an acceptable number. CycleHunter can easily scale up with more workers and CPUs.

4.2 DNS Zones Evaluation

Next we employ CycleHunter to evaluate 7 TLDs and the Root DNS zone (.com, Table 5.7 TLDs and the Root DNS zone (.com, .net, .org are publicly available at [11], while .se and .nu on [13], and the Root zone at [12], the other ccTLDs: .nl and .nz). For each zone, we show the number of domains (size) and the total number of NS records (NSset).
From the total 184M domains we evaluated, we obtained 3.6M distinct NS records. CycleHunter then probes each of them as described in Figure 9, and ultimately we found 44 cyclic dependent NS records (Cyclic in Table 5). We manually verified the 44 cyclic dependent records and confirmed the results. In total, 1435 domain names employed these cyclic dependent domains, and are ultimately unreachable.

The numbers, fortunately, are not that large, and suggest that they are more likely to be caused by configuration errors – as these domains are unresolvable. However, adversaries could exploit that to incur damage.

4.2.1 Singling out .nl Cyclic Domains: The 6M .nl domain names yield to 79k NS records (Table 5). CycleHunter identified 6 zones related to these NSes that had cyclic dependency – 3 of them were .nl domain names, and the other were .com and .net. There were 64 domains that employed these cyclic DNS zones (affect.).

Out of the 3 .nl zones, two were test domains we configured ourselves – so they are not publicized and receive no more than 1k daily queries. The remaining domain (bugged-example.nl), however, is an old domain, registered in 2004. Given we have access to .nl authoritative DNS traffic, we use ENTRADA [38, 44], an open-source DNS analytics platform to determine the daily queries this cyclic domain received. Figure 11 shows the results. We see very few queries until mid June (<300 daily). However, on May 19, the domain owner changed the NS records of the domain, to a cyclic dependent setup – probably a human error as in the case of .nz (§2). And from June 4th, we start to observe a significant amount of queries to this domain: 2.2M, reaching up to 27M on June 8th. From that point on, we see three intervals with large volume of queries, which average each 42M daily queries to this domain. The first interval (July 3rd–July 13th), last for the 10 days, the second for over a month (Sep. 13th – Oct. 15th), an the last one for 43 days (Oct. 21st – Dec. 3rd).

Figure 11 shows also that most of these queries come from Google. To fix that, we notified the domain owner on Dec. 4th, and they quickly fixed their NS settings, which after that, the number of queries reduced to 300 daily (we did this analysis prior to GDNS being repaired).

Given that .nl receives roughly 2B queries per day, these 42M daily accounted for 2.5% of all queries (for comparison, .nz TsuNAME event domains accounted for 1/3 of all queries – §2). Without CycleHunter, however, we would not be able to detect this configuration and mitigate it.

We see that simply having cyclic dependencies does not trigger large volume of queries – our two test domains that have cyclic dependency have not experienced large volume of queries. But when a vulnerable resolver finds them, they may send many queries, in loop mode.

4.3 Resolver software evaluation

Having solving the issue with GDNS, we reduce the capacity of a potential DDoS that would abuse TsuNAME. However, as shown in Table 4, Google was not the only affected resolver operator.

We set out to determine if current resolver software is vulnerable to TsuNAME. We set out two tests: determine if a resolver loops in the presence of cyclic dependencies and if it caches/detect these loops (details in https://tsuname.io/advisory.pdf).

We configure a test zone with cyclic dependency (as we did in §3) and evaluate popular DNS resolvers: Unbound (v 1.6.7) [24], BIND (v 9.11.3) [14], and KnotDNS (v 5.1.3) [7], on a VM we run on AWS EC2 (Fra). We found that none of the start looping in the presence of cyclic dependent domains, hence they are not vulnerable.

We also evaluated public DNS services, in specifically Quad9 [30], Quad1 [1]. However, we found that Cisco’s OpenDNS [26] had a similar problem to Google: it would loop in the presence of continuous incoming queries. We notified the operators, and they have also fixed the issue on 2021-04-13.

Loop detection: resolver developers are always on the look for conditions that may cause loops. Unbound DNS change log, for example, lists 28 entries related to loops [25].

5 VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE

We wish to protect zone operators from DDoS attacks with TsuNAME. The problem can be solved by modifying recursive resolvers and DNS forwarders to break from loop in the presence of cyclic dependencies, and by deploying updated versions of resolvers software (which always takes time). However, operator of an authoritative DNS service can protect their servers by ensuring that no zones in their domain have cyclic dependencies. In the long run, both of these changes should be in place, since either new recursive...
software or new domains with cyclic dependencies would otherwise recreate the problem.

To address these problems we have reached out to notify Google, whose public DNS service represents the largest recursive resolver traffic we see, and worked together with them. After that, they solved this problem at their GDNS. As part of these disclosures we followed best practices, allowing operators at least 90 days to address problems. This threshold is consistent with cert.org’s 45-day notification policy [5] Google Project Zero’s 90-day policy [9].

In addition to Google we also notified operators of the ASes that generated the greatest amount of recursive traffic in our experiments from §3. Of these ten, three responded to us. Of those, two reported that they were running very old recursive resolver software. One was using PowerDNS resolver (3.6.2-2, from 2014 [29]), and the other was using Windows 2008R2. Both planned to update these resolvers.

### 5.1 Private and public disclosure

Our first private notification to a group was during OARC34, in which we disclosed the vulnerability during a members-only section(2021-02-05) [19], as can be seen in Table 6. Moreover, we have disclosed the vulnerability to other trusted communities, including the Asian Pacific, the European, and the Latin American TLD associations (APTLTD, CENTR, and LACTLD, respectively). We have also notified the Root DNS operators and Verisign, the operator of .com and .net. We will public disclose the vulnerability on May 6th, 2021 (3 months after the first private disclosure at DNS-OARC).

**Operators reaction:** Our presentation during the Virtual OARC34 meeting draw interest from various operators. First, we had publicly two other ccTLDs that had experienced this type of attack firsthand. The first one – an European ccTLD – went through the same as .nz and had its own event, which they kindly shared with us.

On a particular day in 2019, around 19:00 UTC, two domains in their zones were misconfigured with cyclic dependencies. Given these domain names were particularly popular in the country, it cause the largest surged we have seen from TsuNAME related events: 10x traffic growth. Figure 12 shows a timeseries of queries (y axis anonymized by the operator). It was only fixed once the ccTLD operator contacted the domain owner, who fixed the situation on the day after, around 11:00 UTC. Similarly to the .nz event, we see a immediate drop in the traffic.

A second large anycast operator confirmed that Google had at least in one occasion sent a surge of queries to their authoritative servers, several years ago, following a misconfiguration with cyclic dependency. Their experience was worse than ours: similar to our experiments (§3), the first see a surge in UDP queries from Google. To curb that, they use response rate limiting (RRL), which allows an authoritative server to set the maximum queries/s, per client IP address [41]. When queries start not being answered, they observed that Google started to fall back over TCP, which has its own overhead compared to UDP, amplifying the problem even further. Last, several operators downloaded and contributed to CycleHunter, our open-source tool, making it faster and improving its usability. We are thankful to all of them.

**Public Disclosure:** On May 6th, we will public disclose TsuNAME, on its official website [39]. Together with that, we will be releasing a security advisory for both authoritative servers and resolver operators.

### 5.2 Problem solved at Google and OpenDNS

After our notifications, both Google and OpenDNS fixed their public resolver services. This, in turn, should reduce the volume of queries one may receive in an event that exploits TsuNAME (we confirmed this for Google Public DNS).

However, there are plenty of older resolver software that may be vulnerable on the Internet –see Figure 7 – and, as such we recommend both authoritative servers operators to take measures to prevent attacks. We describe what steps to take at a security advisory we release on May 6th, 2021 [22].

**Figure 12:** TsuNAME event at an Anonymous EU-based ccTLD operator.
6 CONCLUSIONS

This paper identified TsuNAME, a vulnerability which allows an attacker to carry out reflection-based DDoS attacks to overwhelm authoritative servers.

What makes TsuNAME particularly dangerous is that it can be exploited to carry out DDoS attacks against critical DNS infrastructure like large TLDs or ccTLDs, potentially affecting country-specific services. We observed 50% traffic increases due to TsuNAME in production in .nz traffic, which was due to a configuration error and not a real attack. In controlled experiments we have generated 5600 queries/s using a test domain name. We have also received reports of 10x traffic growth due to a two domains being misconfigured with a cyclic dependency, from an Anonymous European ccTLD. An adversary could achieve far more damage using multiple domains and using a large botnet to probe open resolvers besides its own local resolvers.

We have disclosed TsuNAME to operators of large recursive resolvers and some authoritative servers (more notifications are ongoing), and worked with Google engineers, who successfully fixed GDNS. Moreover, OpeDNS folks also fixed their software after our notification. We release CycleHunter [6], an open-source tool that allows any zone operator to check for cyclic-dependent domains. We hope with these disclosures, our CycleHunter tool and this paper the TsuNAME problem can be resolved before it is exploited.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Puneet Sood, Warren Kumari, Brian Dickson, Barry Greene, Keith Mitchell, Denesh Bhabuta, Benno Overeinder, Dario Ciccarese, Ralph Weber and the DNS-OARC community for their feedback and support in handling this vulnerability disclosure. We thank the Anonymous European ccTLD operator for kindly sharing their experience and their traffic graph when they experienced a TsuNAME event (Figure 12).

We thank all contributors to CycleHunter on Github: https://github.com/SIDN/CycleHunter/graphs/contributors

We also thank the Ripe Atlas measurement platform [33, 34], which we used extensively in the characterization of this vulnerability in [21].

REFERENCES


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